1.
Introduction.
It is increasingly recognized that Law plays an important role in economic development, and various approaches have been used to measure its quality. One approach is to measure the quality of law on the books, which entails identifying key indicators of good rules and, then analyzing whether or not the relevant statutes of a given country include these indicators. For example, one can identify a set of rules that appear to be relevant for protecting minority shareholders and test how many of these indicators are actually included in the laws of different countries. Another approach is to measure the extent to which rules are effectively enforced. Survey data that measure the effectiveness of the judiciary, rule of law, the absence of corruption, low risk of contract repudiation and low risk of government expropriation observed during 1980-1995 are five common measures. In this paper, we use the term legality to capture the effectiveness of the law, rather than the quality of the law on the books. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between economic development and legality using a 49-country data set compiled by La Porta et al. (1997; . Log GNP per capita in 1994 proxies for economic development; a weighted average of the five previously mentioned legality variables proxies for legality. Figure 1 plots log GNP per capita against log legality: it also plots the fitted line obtained from regressing log GNP per capita against log legality and a constant term. There is substantial variance in economic development in our sample: after converting from its log representation, GNP per capita ranges from 270 to 35,760 dollars in 1994. The strong association observed between economic development and legality in our sample is striking. The estimated linear regression coefficient implies that a 1-percent increase in legality is associated with a 4.75-percent increase in GNP per capita. The regression coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-percent level, and legality explains roughly 83-percent of the variance in economic development.
The strong association between legality and economic development could mean simply that rich countries can afford better institutions. 1 An alternative explanation is that good legal institutions are a precondition for long term economic growth and development. In his analysis of economic history, North (1981) ) argues that the emergence of law enforcement systems to protect private business activity has played a critical role in rapid industrialization. A growing literature emphasizes the crucial role of institutions, including legal institutions, for sustained economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1994; Landes 1998; Mauro 1995; Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Williamson 1985) . Just what explains the substantial variance in legality across countries is,
however, an open question. Legal technical assistance programs that focus primarily on improving the statutory laws in developing countries assume that supplying the right laws on the books will enhance legality, and ultimately economic development. However, many of these programs have not produced the expected results.
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While La Porta et. al. (1997) show that the quality of law is critical for financial market development, legal 1 La seem to endorse this view. 2 The most glaring example is Russia, where the drafters of the corporate code now concede that the idea of picking the right laws and thereby enhance corporate governance has essentially failed. (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova 1999) .
scholars have long noted that the quality of law on the books does not ensure the laws will actually be enforced (Pound 1911 ).
This paper develops and tests the proposition that the way in which the modern formal legal order that evolved in some Western countries was transplanted into other countries is a much more important determinant of legality and economic development today than the supply of a particular legal code. Our argument is based on two key notions. First, for the law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law. Second, the judges, lawyers, politicians, and other legal intermediaries that are responsible for developing the law must be able
to increase the quality of law in a way that is responsive to demand for legality.
In order to test our theory, we develop proxies for the way in which law has been transplanted and received and the supply of particular legal codes. Regarding supply, we note that countries around the world are commonly divided into four legal families: English-common law, French-civil law, German-civil law, and
Scandinavian-civil law. Legal scholars show that these families differ significantly in style. 3 However, in a path breaking study, La demonstrate in a 49-country data set that there is a significant difference in the quality of the laws between legal families at least with respect to investor protection laws (shareholder and creditor rights). We thus use legal families as a proxy for the contents and quality of the supplied law.
In order to proxy for the way in which the law has been transplanted and received, we develop a definition of the "transplant effect". The 49-country data set used by La Porta et al (1998) can also be divided between countries that developed their formal legal order internally (origins) and those that received their formal legal order externally (transplants). For classifying countries as either origins or transplants, we choose the period during which a country first developed or received a comprehensive formal legal order. For most countries, the relevant period is the nineteenth century; for some it reaches into the first half of the twentieth century. Our basic argument is that for law to be effective, a demand for law must exist so that the law on the books will actually be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the law are responsive to this demand. If the transplant adapted the law to local conditions, or had a population that was already familiar with basic legal principles of the transplanted law, then we would expect that the law would be used. Because the law would be used, a strong public demand for institutions to enforce this law would follow. And, legal intermediaries that are responsible for developing and enforcing this imported law would be able to develop the law so at to match demand, because the strong demand for law would provide resources for legal change. Where these conditions are present we would expect the legal order to function just as effectively as in an origin country where the law was developed internally. However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions, or if it was imposed via colonization and the population within the transplant was not familiar with the law, then we would expect that initial demand for using these laws to be weak. Legal intermediaries would have a more difficult time developing the law to match the demand. Countries that receive the law in this fashion are thus subject to the "transplant effect": their legal order would function less effectively than either origins or transplants that either adapted the law to local conditions and/or had a population that was familiar with the transplanted law.
Our econometric analysis shows that the "transplant effect" is a much more important predictor of legality than the supply of particular legal families. Controlling for the supply of legal families, we find that legality is 33 percent lower in transplant effect countries. Supplying German civil law only marginally offsets the transplant effect: legality is 24 percent lower in countries within these legal family that are subject to the transplant effect.
The English common law and French civil law does not offset the transplant effect, and the Scandinavian family has no measurable impact because it includes only origins. Furthermore, it is not the case that only richer countries have better legality. Controlling for GNP per capita, the transplant effect has a strong negative impact on legality.
Our econometric analysis also shows that the transplant effect influences economic development indirectly through its impact on legality, and has no direct impact. We find that the transplant effect can explain roughly 69-percent of the variance in legality, which in turn (as shown in figure 1 ) explains 83-percent of the variance in GNP per capita. The transplant effect's indirect impact is quite substantial. For example, Ecuador received the French law during 1831-1881 without significant adaptation. Moreover, the citizens of Ecuador were not familiar with the transplanted law. Had Ecuador been in a position to develop its own legal system internally or to adapt the transplanted law better to its local conditions, back of the envelope calculations suggest that its 1994 GNP per capita would have increased from $1,200 U.S. to roughly Ireland's level ($13,000 US). The policy implication of this result is fundamental: a legal reform strategy should aim at improving legality by carefully choosing legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by domestic law makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final consumers of these ruler. In short, legal reform must ensure that there is a domestic demand for the new law, and that supply can match demand. The close fit between the supply and demand for formal legal rules appears to be a crucial condition for improving the overall effectiveness of legal institutions, which over time will foster economic development. While further research is warranted before making practical policy recommendations, a cautious suggestion would be that legal borrowing should take place either from a country with a similar legal heritage, or substantial investments should be made in legal information and training prior to adoption of a law, so that domestic agents can enhance their familiarity with the imported law and make an informed decision about how to adapt the law to local conditions. This would at least increase the possibility that the new law will be used in practice. It is, however, vain to expect that an effective transplant strategy will have a direct or immediate impact on economic development.
There seems to be a moderate direct impact of supplying a particular legal family on economic development. However, not only is the direct effect dominated by the indirect transplant effect, it also appears sensitive to the impact of a few outliers, and might therefore proxy some other unobservable effects. Thus, there is no reason to conclude from our analysis that a transplant strategy that favors a particular legal family would make a significant difference.
The transplant effect, while strongly path dependent, is not irreversible. Several countries that received law in the fashion of Ecuador have considerably better legality ratings than our model predicts. Examples include Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain, and Portugal. Most, but not all, of these countries have relatively recently overcome authoritarian rule in a peaceful manner and have made considerable investments in their legal system, including a reform of the judiciary. These changes suggest a growing demand for a formal legal order, which was met by a state that at least now was committed to investing into and upholding a formal legal order. These results also suggest that even though our theory has strong explanatory power, it does not explain everything. In particular, it does not capture how ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or natural resource endowment, factors thatas others have shown -(La Porta et al. 1999; Mauro 1995; Sachs and Warner 1995) impact on the quality of government institutions.
This paper contributes to an emerging literature that attempts to explain the variance in legality across countries. With the exception of papers by La Porta et al (1997 and North (1989) , to date most of this work has been theoretical. For example, Skaperdas (1999) and Grossmann (1995) develop models that derive conditions under which citizens allocate resources to productive or predatory behavior that undermines legality. There is also an emerging literature on just why legality emerges or fails to emerge in formerly socialist economies that are making a transition to a market economy. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) explain the emergence of corruption during the transition, and Berkowitz and Li (1999) explain why Chinese local governments have been typically much more effective than Russian local governments in providing a stable business environment. Roland and Verdier (1999) show how policies observed in transition economies can be interpreted as mechanisms to improve legality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our argument that the way in which the law is transplanted is a critical determinant of legality, code our 49 countries accordingly, and develop a definition of the transplant effect. In section three, we test the hypothesis that the way in which the law was transplanted and received matters more than the supply of a particular family for the effectiveness of legal institutions (legality).
In section four, we analyze the relationship between economic development, legality
represented by the principle component of the legality proxies (controlling for the significant multicollinearity between these proxies), and the transplant effect. Section five addresses two important potential problems with our econometric analysis. Firstly, it examines whether the use of a principle component legality variable might have distorted the underlying story; secondly, it combines system inferential procedures (specification search and elimination) with Monte Carlo simulation techniques to fully account for the fact that all implied coefficient restrictions in our model are highly non-linear and that the sample size is relatively small. A striking finding is that the principle components techniques utilized virtually capture the full interaction between the demand and supply variables, the five legality proxies and economic development. A practical implication of this is that it is possible to extend our analysis to include countries that have less than five of the legality proxies. Section 6 concludes with policy implications and directions for future research.
The Transplant Effect
Virtually all countries today have a set of rules embodied in codes or court cases that were established by designated state organs, and state institutions in charge of enforcing these rules. We call this set of rules the formal legal order. Although it is quite important in many countries today, the formal legal order is but one element of the governance structure of society. All societies, including the most developed ones, are also governed by informal norms and institutions. This informal legal order evolves over time mostly by internalizing existing norms of a social group (Coleman 1990; Sunstein 1996) . It is enforced not by the state, but relies largely upon trust and reputation effects as well as monitoring devices. As we will further discuss below, the existing formal legal order in most countries around the world was shaped by transplanting formal legal systems that have evolved in several European countries in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While many, although not all of the countries that received these formal legal orders from the West had formal legal orders prior to transplantation, the transplantation of the Western formal legal systems accelerated the development of the formal legal order.
In this section we introduce the "transplant effect" in order to characterize the transplanting process. We propose that countries that have developed formal legal orders internally, adapted the transplanted law to local conditions, and/or had a population that was already familiar with basic legal principles of the transplanted law should be able to further develop the formal legal codes and build effective legal systems. By contrast, countries that received foreign legal systems without similar pre-dispositions are much more constrained in their ability to develop the formal legal order and will have greater difficulties to develop effective legal systems (the transplant effect). In order to test these propositions empirically, we divide our 49 countries into ten that developed their formal legal order internally (origins) and 39 that received their formal legal order externally (transplants); we then divide the transplants into those that are and those that are not subject to the transplant effect. We conclude by demonstrating the transplant effect with a simple model.
Origins vs. Transplants
Most countries derived their current formal legal order from Europe during the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Earlier legal transplants are well known, including the reception of Roman law in Europe, the enactment of the Chinese codes in other parts of Asia, or the transfer of Spanish and Portuguese law to Latin America. Indeed, as Watson (1974) argues, legal transplants are as old as the law is. The transplanting process that occured in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries superseded all earlier transplants. Moreover, despite lively borrowing and transplantation since then, most countries have retained the core characteristics of the legal system they had received during 1769-1945. The wholesale transplantation of legal systems was made possible by the consolidation and formalization of legal systems in Europe that coincided with the development of the nation state.
The expansion of European influence through war and conquest was primarily responsible for the transplantation of these laws to countries in Asia, Africa, North America and Latin America, although some of these nonEuropean countries transplanted these laws voluntarily.
Three legal families, the English common law, the French civil law and the German civil law, dominated the process of consolidation and formalization of formal legal orders in Europe. The English common law has evolved over centuries and, in contrast to the French and German civil families, was never systematized and codified. Case law, or precedents established by courts, defined legal principles that were applied to other cases.
The roots of the common law date back to the Norman conquest of England in 1066, but only in the late fifteenth centuries was a firm body of legal principles established that replaced preexisting customary law. The publication of law since the sixteenth century (Ross 1998 ) and the development of legal reports -which was completed in the second half of the nineteenth century ) -contributed to the formation of a consistent body of law that was widely accessible. Statutory law gained in importance in the nineteenth century, but case law remains the hallmark of the English legal system to this day.
In continental Europe, codification resulted in a formal legal order that is very different than the English common law. The French issued the first comprehensive national civil, commercial and criminal codes, as well as separate civil and criminal procedure codes between 1804 and 1811. The French (Napoleonic) codes consolidated legislation operating before the French revolution and codified existing business practice Zweigert and Kötz 1998) in language that was systematic and accessible to lay people. Politically, the codification movement manifested the superiority of the parliament over the executive and the judiciary in making new law. The other major codification of the nineteenth century is the German civil code of 1886, which had been preceded by commercial, criminal, civil and criminal procedure codes, as well as a bankruptcy law. Codification in Germany was delayed until the end of the nineteenth century primarily for political reasons. Only with unification in 1871, did codification move forward. The German codes, in particular the civil code, differ from the earlier French codification. Legal scholars compiled a consistent system of civil law based on Roman legal principles, and, as such, wrote codes that were highly technical and thus much less accessible to lay people.
Most legal families operating currently are derived either from the English common law, the French civil law or the German civil law. We denote England, France and Germany as origin countries, or simply origins, because their formal legal orders developed largely internally and display highly idiosyncratic features, some legal borrowing notwithstanding, and because their formal legal order served as a model for other countries.
Comparative legal scholarship also distinguishes a fourth legal family, the Scandinavian one . The Scandinavian legal family is not built around a major codification, like the French or the German legal family, nor does it have a body of case law like the English common law. However, early codification of existing business practices and the close political and economic relations among the four Scandinavian countries have given rise to a legal system based on statutory law, that is distinct from the legal systems described above. Thus, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden are origins.
In our 49 country-sample, the United States, Austria and Switzerland are also origins because the development of their formal legal order was highly idiosyncratic. While English common law influenced the legal system in the United States during the colonial period, legal development in the United States has sharply diverged from the English system after the colonial period. 4 Each new state that broke away from the colony decided how much of the common law of England would be part of the new legal order (Posner 1998) . 5 Moreover, statutory law has played an increasingly important role since the adoption of the American constitution. 6 Austria and Switzerland are also origins. According to standard classification, both countries belong to the German legal family. The codification that forms the basis of the Austrian civil law, the AGBGB, was adopted in 1811, over ninety years before the adoption of the German civil code. It influenced the development of the German code, rather than the other way around. The major Swiss codification (the law on obligations of 1881 and the civil code of 1907) followed the German codification. However, it did not incorporate Roman law to the same extent as the German codifications, and differs considerably in style and organization from the German code . Table 1 lists the ten origins in our sample and notes the time when these systems were formed. All other countries (or territories that were later organized as independent states) received their formal legal orders, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from these ten origin countries. We call these countries "transplants". In order to characterize the transplantation process, we note that a legal order existed in transplants at the time when the European law was transplanted and that many countries had formalized at least part of their legal systems. A legal order is a property of every society (Coleman 1990 Hooker shows that issues of morality are much closer interwoven with legal rules and ambiguity 4 The distinctiveness of American law is apparent, when one compares it with the development of law in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, all of which stayed much closer to the English common law system. 5 A similar process took place in other colonies when they became independent. This took place, however, much later and had little impact on the formal legal order that developed initially in these territories. 6 This is evident, for example in the development of bankruptcy law in the two countries, which increasingly diverged over time. According to Franks and Sussman, different patterns of law makin, or legal innovation account for this. (Franks and Sussman 1999) . 7 La Porta et al (1998) analyze all the indicators of shareholder and creditor rights and conclude that the French have the worst investor-protection laws. 8 There is an extensive literature on the importance of informal legal orders in the US, including (Bernstein 1992; Ellickson 1991; Macaulay 1962) .
rather than specificity characterizes their wording. Other societies did not have a formal legal order that was embodied in codes or case law and enforced primarily by the state. They were governed by an informal legal order that was enforced by social sanctions, including reputation effects and mutual monitoring (Kronman 1985; Newman 1983 ). The social norms and enforcement mechanisms used differed considerably from society to society.
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The preexisting legal order typically persisted after the process of transplantation was complete. In part, this was the indended outcome. In some instances, for example, the transplanted European law applied only to the European population, while local people continued to be governed by local custom. This was true in particular for Dutch colonies (Hooker 1975) . In other cases, criminal and administrative law was applied to local people, but in family, inheritance, but also commercial matters, local law prevailed. This was the practice in many English colonies, although the jurisdiction of common law courts was often extended over time Knapp 1972) .
Even when transplanted law was not as clearly circumscribed, and therefore in principle applicable to all subjects in all areas of the law, the government organs did not always enforce the transplanted formal legal order against the indigenous population.
We do not have data on the effectiveness of the initial legal order and can only speculate at the ability of countries to develop an effective legal order internally, had they not received the legal order from the West. Our data, however, allow us to determine whether the transplantation of foreign law has helped or hindered these countries to develop levels of legality that are comparable with those of origins. Legal scholars have long observed that there is a gap between formal law on the books and law in action (Pound 1911) . While this gap exists in origins, we would expect to observe a larger gap between law on the books and law in action in transplants. The logic of this prediction follows from the idea that the law is primarily a "cognitive institution" (Means 1980 ). This is self-evident with respect to the informal legal order. Observance of this law requires knowledge of the customs and habits of a social group. The fact that formal legal orders have put the key elements of the legal order in writing tends to disguise the fact that the effectiveness of these rules also rests on knowledge and understanding of these rules and their underlying values by social actors. While most members of society will not, and in fact need not, be familiar with the specifics of individual rules and regulations, they are familiar with the basic concepts of the legal order. Moreover, they can rely on legal professionals as intermediaries, who have a better knowledge of the formal legal order. But even for professionals to apply a special rule, they must not only grasp the wording of that rule, but also the concept behind it, the value judgments on which its rests, and its position within the overall legal order. Even a seemingly clear law -do not steal! -raises a host of interpretative problems when applied to real world cases. What about taking from a common pool, or overgrazing? What about taking something with the intention of returning it later, or picking up an object that (apparently) has been abandoned by the owner? An identical rule like this one will be interpreted differently by those charged with applying it and their understanding of the underlying values on which this norm 9 For an account of the complexity and variety of pre-colonial law in South/East Asia see (Hooker 1975) .
rests. This is true even within the same legal system. If this was not the case, countries would not need several court instances and a supreme court with the task of ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of the law.
When a transplant country applies a rule that it has transplanted from an origin, it is effectively applying a rule to its own local circumstances that was developed in a foreign socioeconomic order. Thus, we would expect that the interpretation of a legal rule will differ more within a transplant than an origin. Applying a simple rule that prohibits stealing in the context of communal property is a case in point. Other examples include:
1. the enforcement of the freedom of contract principle in a society governed by kinship relations or guangxi -the Chinese term that refers norms of reciprocity or more generally, human emotions (Hamilton 1998);
2. the introduction of the corporate form in pre-Revolutionary mainland China, where mistrust in the state prevented entrepreneurs from registering their business with the state (Kirby 1995);  3. the introduction of the corporate form in a country like Columbia, which at that time was dominated by a handful of state run enterprises, overwhelmingly agricultural production, and state policies that discouraged the formation of private capital (Means 1980) .
In each of the above cases the transplanted law was largely ineffective. In early 20th century China, for example, family owned businesses frequently called themselves limited liability company but in fact were unincorporated family owned businesses. In the words of Kirby, "it had become fashionable and modern to attach the term youxian gongsi (limited company) to almost any enterprise. But it was not in vogue to register with the government, even with the very weak central government of 1916-28" (Kirby 1995) at p. 50). Even where the corporate form was used, outside finance was marginal, as kinship networks provided the most important financial resources (Hamilton and Feenstra 1997) . They also ensured that obligations would be honored. And in Columbia, the introduction of the corporate law did not lead to the establishment of corporations or the reorganization of existing partnerships. In fact, there is evidence that knowledge of the existence of this law was not wide spread (Means 1980) . The context specificity of formal legal order has important implications for the effectiveness of the legal order (legality) in transplant countries. Where the meaning of specific legal rules or legal institutions is not apparent, they will either not be applied or applied in a way that may be inconsistent with the intention of the rule in the context in which it originated. This in turn has implications for the perception and trustworthiness of the institutions applying them, and thus for the future demand for these institutions. However, if a transplant country adopts foreign laws from origins in a way that is sensitive to its initial conditions, then the meaning of these rules becomes clearer, and it is also simpler to develop institutions such as the courts, procurators, anti-trust agencies, etc. that enforce these rules. We conjecture that there are two reasons for this. First, when the law is adapted to local needs, people will use it and want to allocate resources for enforcing and developing the formal legal order.
Second, legal intermediaries responsible for enforcing and developing the formal legal order can be more effective when they are working with a formal law which is broadly compatible with the preexisting order, or which has been adapted to match demand.
Our core proposition is that legality is determined by the ability of a country to give meaning to the transplanted formal legal order and to apply it within the context of its own socioeconomic conditions. Countries that developed a formal legal order internally, i.e. origins, should develop more effective legal institutions than countries that received the formal legal order externally by way of transplant. However, there may be cases where the transplanted law is more or less compatible with the initial order and this could offset the fact that law was transplanted. This possibility is reflected in our classification of different transplants. -as in the case of Japan during the Meji restoration, which had just been forced into signing unequal treaties with Western powers. In light of this experience, the establishment of a modern legal system was seen as a prerequisite for a an economically and military strong, independent country (Baum and Takahashi 2000; ). Yet, the choice of the legal system and its ultimate design was still in the hands of the Japanese government. By contrast, involuntary transplants are countries on which a foreign power imposed a formal legal order by colonization and/or war. Colonization usually establishes foreign rule for long periods of time and leaves strong imprints on the institutions of a given country. Wars, however, may be only short lived. Once they are over, the decision to retain or abrogate the legal system that was imposed during the war is again in the hands of the domestic government.
Receptive and unreceptive transplants
Large parts of Europe, for example, received the French codes during the Napoleonic wars. These wars ended soon with the defeat of France. After 1815 the countries on which the Napoleonic codes had been imposed were free to decide whether or not to retain these codes. Most countries did, albeit on a preliminary basis. Many of these countries subsequently initiated their own national codifications. They usually drew heavily on the French codes.
But this time, the reception was voluntary, rather than involuntary. Since these national codification rather than the earlier imposed Napoleonic codes have shaped their long term legal development, we call them voluntary transplants. Thus, involuntary transplants in our data base are only countries on which a foreign legal system was imposed during colonization. Table 3 shows that there are a total of 20 voluntary and 19 involuntary transplants in our data base.
The fact that a transplant country voluntarily receives a formal legal order does not imply this transplanted formal legal is compatible with its initial conditions. Domestic policy makers may decide to copy the law and are free to choose from different models. The decision to import a foreign legal system may, however, be determined by national pride, the desire to bring a country up to standards with the so called "civilized world", or the hope to increase the prospects of foreign investments. None of these considerations necessarily suggests that the formal legal order will be understood and can be meaningfully applied to real world cases in the receiving country.
This is the case only, if additional conditions exist, that make a country receptive to the transplanted law.
Our argument is that a voluntary transplant increases its own receptivity by making a significant adaptation of the foreign formal legal order to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and informal legal order. Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these rules has been considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic legal practice or other initial conditions. Means (1980) , for example, reports that Columbia voluntarily, but almost blindly, transplanted the Spanish commercial code of 1829. The few changes were made in ignorance of the implications of these rules for business practice. For example, a provision requiring state approval for the formation of a corporation, which at the time was still common throughout Europe, was eliminated from the books. Years later when the code was amended, this time using Chilean law as a model, state approval became mandatory, despite the fact that this rule had meanwhile been liberalized in most other countries. Adaptation does not necessarily require that the transplanted law is changed significantly. However, at the very least, an informed choice about alternative rules must have been made. Extensive comparative research prior to the adoption of a foreign legal system is indicative for an informed choice. A good example is Japan, where extensive debates about the adoption of English or French law, and several drafts based on the French model preceded the promulgation of codes that were largely based on the German model (Haley 1991; .
Another indicator that a voluntary transplant is receptive to formal legal order is that it has familiarity with the legal system that it uses as a model for legal borrowing. Countries that share a common legal history will be familiar with the transplanted legal concepts and will therefore have little reason to make major adaptations or to choose a system that is less familiar to them. Common roots in the distant past are, however, not sufficient. Most of the European countries can trace their legal history back to the Roman Empire. Yet, quite distinct legal systems developed on the basis of the Roman law, which incorporated centuries of legal practice that combined elements of Roman law with customary rules. Not all countries in Europe shared this experience in the same way. Spain, for example had codified Roman law already in the thirteenth century and supplemented these rules periodically with imperial ordinances. However, Spain did not develop the legal principles that gave rise to the modern business corporation or an elaborate system of property rights based on the (political) recognition of the right to ownership.
This also implies that Latin America, which received Spanish law in the 16th century, was exposed to Roman legal heritage, not, however, to the development of the private law, which formed the core of the formal legal orders that emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century. Similarly, Greece can trace the roots of its legal system back to the Roman law. In fact, the famous compilation of the classic Roman jurists' texts under emperor Iustinian, the corpurs iuris civilis, which is the basis of the European Roman legal heritage, was a product of the East Roman empire (Stein 1999) . However, the Byzantine law Greece enacted in 1821 after independence from Turkish rule differed significantly in content and style from the modern French law it transplanted subsequently, despite the fact that the French law is also based on Roman law. Finally, the legal development of Korea and Japan was long influenced by
Chinese law (Haley 1991) . But when Japan transplanted its law to Korea, this was the new Japanese law that had been transplanted from Germany (Hahm 1996a; . There is no definite time limit to distinguish a distant legal heritage from a more recently shared common legal history. From our discussion of law as a cognitive institution, it follows that the common history must still be recognizable in legal practice at the time when the foreign law is transplanted.
To summarize, if a voluntary transplant has familiarity with the country or countries from which it takes the formal legal order, and/or it transplants the formal legal order with significant adaptation to its initial conditions, then the voluntary transplant is receptive. Otherwise, the voluntary transplant is unreceptive. These definitions are summarized in box 1; following these definitions, table 3 categorizes our 20 voluntary transplants into the receptive and unreceptive categories.
Involuntary transplants, under certain conditions, may also be categorized as receptive. Involuntary transplants received their formal legal order as colonies, and this transmission process varied across countries. As noted already, in the Dutch colonies, the foreign law applied primarily to members of the colonizing power.
English common law was introduced in the early colonies in a gradual fashion. The East Indian Company established the first courts on the subcontinent, which applied English common law. Whether this law applied only to the English subjects or also to the local population remained unclear for decades. Only when the British government took over control from the company in the middle of the nineteenth century was the general jurisdiction of the common law established. A court system, which referred to the privy council as the highest court was created. For the purposes of transplanting English common law to other parts of the empire, it was codified, which greatly accelerated the transplantation of the common law to the Indian subcontinent and later to other parts of the empire. The introduction of English common law to other countries was swifter. Kenya and Zimbabwe were colonized only at the end of the 19th century. They received English law by decree, which stipulated that the law in force in England at a certain day would now apply in the territory. Still, exemptions were sometimes made for certain matters of the law such as family inheritance (Mann and Robert 1991) . Similar principles applied to the imposition of French law in French colonies.
In some colonies, the transplantation of foreign law took quite a different form. The English Empire distinguished between "settled" and "conquered" territories. Settled territories were considered to be barren land, the existence of indigenous people like the Indians in North America, the Aborigines in Australia, or the Maoris in New Zealand notwithstanding. But these territories were designated for migration from Europe and, in fact, experienced a massive influx of European people. The migrants used violence and their control of economic resources to seize power from the indigenous population. English law was transplanted to these territories through migration. The first settlers brought the law with them. In some cases, the applicability of English law remained in doubt or was disputed, and was only confirmed by the English crown. For our purposes, however, the important point is that in the case of the so-called settled territories, European law was not imposed on people accustomed to an entirely different legal order, but was applied to people who were familiar with the basic principles of the colonial legal order. 10 Therefore an involuntary transplant is receptive if, because of the migration process, it exhibits familiarity with the formal legal order. Otherwise, the involuntary transplant is unreceptive. There are 11
10 That these territories greatly benefited from the legal order they had brought with them was noted already by Adam Smith (1976 book IV chapter 7). The contrast with Latin America, which had been colonized earlier by imperial Spain, and where the Spanish elite was by far outnumbered by locals and Slaves was indeed striking. Finer (1997 Finer ( pp. 1394 gives shareholders wide discretion in designing the internal structure of the corporation, for example, can hardly be understood without appreciating the role of the judiciary as an instance of last resort in defining the boundaries of this flexibility (Coffee 1989) . Countries that do not offer shareholders recourse to the courts to a similar extent, tend to have a much more rigid structure. Transplanting one element of the law (a flexible rule) without another (effective enforcement institutions) is unlikely to produce the desired results.
11
In order to have a better understanding of the functioning of a legal rule in the context of a legal system, it is helpful to be closer to the legal system in which a rule originated. This facilitates access to information about the interpretation and application of the law to real world cases. Countries that borrow from another transplant are more remote from this information. The other transplant may have altered the original law in the process of transplanting it. While this may have increased the receptivity of the law in the first transplant, the second transplant now has neither access to the original rule nor necessarily understands the reasons for its adaptation.
Thus, it will be difficult to make an informed decision about the impact of this rule on the receiving country's social and economic structure. Even if the rules remained unchanged, the first transplant may still be in the process of giving meaning to the new rules by applying them to real world cases. In this process, the meaning of the rule may change. No two cases are alike in a given legal order, and cases that originate in different legal orders are likely to vary even more from one another. This will undoubtedly lead to different results, even when identical rules are applied. Indirect transplants face the task of trying to understand the original meaning of a rule by inferring from the application of this rule in a context that differs from the one in which the rule originated, but also from their own context. This process can be compared to translating a text from the original language to a second, and from this to a third language. Even under the assumption that good translators are at work, the second translation is likely to differ from one that was made directly from the original.
Another reason why indirect transplants may end up with a less effective legal system is that transplanting becomes excessively easy. In particular, when countries share a common language, the temptation to simply enact the laws of a neighboring country may be great, especially when the second country lacks the resources for developing its own legal order independently. If initial conditions in the two countries are similar, the indirect transplant may be just as successful (or unsuccessful) as the first transplant. However, if initial conditions differ, the lack of adaptation decreases the receptivity of the second transplant.
We have 26 direct transplants, and 13 indirect transplants. Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Egypt are all direct-French-family transplants. All English colonies received the common law directly from England. This applies to "settled" as well as to "conquered" territories. Within the German legal family, Japan received the formal legal order directly from Germany. The highest concentration of indirect transplants in our sample can be found in Latin America. These countries were first exposed to European law under Portuguese and Spanish rule. As noted earlier, these laws, however, reflect a different stage of economic and legal development in Europe. The nineteenth century European codes came to Latin America indirectly. The
French origin was transplanted to Spain and Portugal. Both countries first received this law when they were invaded by Napoleon. When they subsequently enacted their own national codes, they copied the There are also some indirect transplants in the German legal family. In particular, Korea and Taiwan received the formal legal order from Japan -itself a transplant of German law -when they came under Japanese colonial rule.
The two criteria we have used to classify transplants can be combined into four groups of transplant countries: direct-receptive transplants, direct-unreceptive transplants, indirect-receptive transplants, and indirectunreceptive transplants. Table 4 groups our transplants into these categories, lists the major period of legal transplantation, and gives some historical background information. A more detailed summary of the coding is available upon request. Our argument implies that all of our transplants, except the direct-receptive group, are subject to the transplant effect. Tables 2a and 2b provide a useful comparison of the origin and transplant categories with the legal families. As already noted, the legal families are excellent predictors of the quality of law on the books. However, Table 2b shows that the origin and transplant categories have almost no ability to explain the quality of law on the books: in 19 of the 22 possible binary comparisons, there is no statistically significant difference between the different categories. While families are superior predictor of law on the books, in the rest of the paper, we will show that the origin and transplant categories are a much stronger predictor of legality.
A Simple Model
The mechanics of the transplant effect are formalized in the following model. Consider an aggregate production function, that represents how a country converts inputs into GNP per capita. In order to produce GNP, any country needs both legality and variable inputs. For simplicity, labor time, denoted W, is the only variable input and the aggregate production function is:
(1)
In this specification, Y denotes GNP per capita (aggregate output), L denotes legality, W denotes labor time, a (1-a) is output elasticity with respect to legality (labor).
We have argued that both informal legal order and the formal legal order determine legality in a particular country. In order to formalize this idea, we posit a legality production function, that requires resources allocated to both the informal and formal legal order:
(2) The legality production function can be re-written in terms of R and θ :
In this specification, legality is strictly increasing in R and strictly concave in
Thus, for any R, the share of resources allocated to F that maximizes legality is:
There is a representative consumer that maximizes one period utility function, which is increasing in consumption, C, and leisure. Labor supply is fixed and normalized at unity: leisure is 1 -W and consumption is GNP net of legal resources: C = Y -R. Combining equations (1) and (3), consumption is a function of work time, legal resources, and the share of legal resources allocated to formal legal order:
In transplant effect countries, share of resources allocated to the formal legal order, , θ is driven by consumer demand, θ is constrained to be no greater than some 1 T < θ because the law has not been adapted to local conditions. The way in which transplant countries receive the formal legal order affects the way legal intermediaries such as the courts, the legal profession and the government, can adapt it to match demand. If the formal legal order is transplanted in an indirect and/or unreceptive fashion, legal intermediaries have trouble developing the modern order to match demand years after transplantation. Legal intermediaries in indirect transplants have difficulties matching demand because they work with a formal legal order that was received primarily from another transplant, rather than from an origin. And, legal intermediaries in unreceptive transplants have difficulties because they must work with a formal legal order that was not adapted and well suited to local conditions when it was first received. In order to derive the demand for , θ we solve the representative consumer's problem:
Maximize In order to analyze the transplant effect, it useful to represent the consumer's problem in the Lagrangian form:
where λ is the shadow price of :
T θ it measures the utility gain following a marginal increase in T θ . The first order conditions for a feasible and optimal solution can be expressed as: When formal legal order is constrained, the allocation of legal resources is inefficient: increasing T θ reduces this efficiency loss: it increases legality, which in turn increases GNP per capita, which then increases welfare. The first point in Proposition 1 is that cost of an inefficient allocation falls as as T θ increases, and the allocation of legal resources between F and I approaches * θ . An implication of this result is that a country that manages to relax the constraint on allocation of legal resources to the formal legal order can reverse the transplant effect, and improve legality.
Since historical evidence suggests that the parameter a has increased over time while ρ has fallen, the second and third points have the striking implication that the impact of constraining allocation of legal resources to F on welfare, output and legality is exacerbated. The informal legal order, I, captures the legal order that typically preceded the formalization of law and that relied on social sanctions, including mutual monitoring, reputation effects, and trust. These mechanisms are effective in relatively small, homogenous, groups. The formal legal order, F, in contrast offer a system of contracts, codified regulations, and legal procedures that can be enforced even 13 The formal solution is in the Appendix.
against parties without preexisting relationships and in an environment with high information costs. Thus, with growing complexity of social and economic relations, the productivity of F relative to I (as captured in the parameter a) increases. Point 3 says that as F becomes relatively more productive, constraining its development becomes more costly. It is also the case that in less complex settings it is easier to substitute between the informal and formal legal order. However, over time, the elasticity of substitution between I and F decreases: it becomes harder to replace formal contracts and formal methods of dispute resolution with informal contracts that rely mainly upon trust and reputation. Point 3 says that the increase in λ driven by the relative productivity gains in F accelerates as it becomes more difficult to substitute between I and F. Then the transplant effect is negative and:
Proof. These results follow trivially from Proposition 1. Points 2 and 3 predict that there is a large difference in GNP per capita and legality between countries that are and are not subject to the transplant effect.
Legality and the Transplant Effect
In this section we present tests of our hypothesis that the way in which the law is transplanted is a more important determinant of legality than the supply of a particular family. The testable implications are that origins and receptive-direct transplants are not subject to the transplant effect; receptive-indirect, unreceptive-direct and unreceptive-indirect transplants are subject to the transplant effect; and, the transplant effect has much greater impact on legality than the supply of a particular legal family. For ease of presentation, all the analysis is conducted by means of single equation ordinary least squares (hereafter OLS) techniques. System validation of our results will be provided separately in section 5.7. Table 5 reports regressions for each of the five legal proxies on transplant and legal family dummy variables. In view of the significant multicollinearity between the five legal proxies, we introduce a univariate 'legality' measure which is defined as the leading principle component of these legality proxies and account for 83% of their overall (unconditional) variance. The English dummy variable and the origin dummy variables are both normalized at zero. Thus, a coefficient on a transplant dummy estimates the difference in legality between that transplant category and an average origin, and there is a "transplant effect" when a transplant dummy is negative. The coefficient for a legal family dummy estimates the difference in legality between that family and an average English country.
The results in Table 5 for the five legality proxies and the legality variable support these hypotheses. The coefficient for receptive-direct transplant is never statistically significant; thus, receptive-direct transplants are not significantly different than origins. The other three transplant groups seem to suffer from a transplant effect: their coefficients are all significantly negative, and 15 of these 18 coefficients are significant at the 1-percent level.
To check that the transplant effect is more important than the supply of a particular legal family, we perform several tests. First, we test the null hypothesis that joint impact of these legal families is negligible (French = 0, German = 0, Scandinavian = 0). Because the p-value of these F-statistics always exceeds .05, we do not reject the null. The F-test for receptive-indirect = 0, unreceptive-direct = 0, unreceptive-indirect = 0 tests the null that these transplant effect groups jointly have a negligible impact on legality and can be set to zero. Because the pvalues is always less than .01, we reject this null even at the 1-percent level. Thus, the joint impact of the transplant effect is always significantly negative, while the joint impact of families is negligible. In the three cells where the family effect is significant, the absolute impact of families on legality is always lower than the absolute impact of any of the three transplants effect groups. These results all support the hypothesis that the transplant effect has a stronger impact than the supply of legal families on legality.
A striking pattern observed by inspection of the regressions for all five legal proxies is the transplant effect coefficient is roughly uniform across the three transplant effect groups. Therefore the next hypothesis we test is that for each legal proxy and for legality the coefficients of the three transplant effect groups are equal. This hypothesis is tested individually for each of the six variables. Since the p-values for these F-tests are never lower than .216, the null is not rejected, and the transplant effect appears to be uniform across the three transplant effect groups. Table 6 reports our best estimate of a reduced form for the determinants of legality. Following the results in Table 5 , we exclude the receptive-direct coefficient, and combine the three transplant effect countries into a transplant effect group. Since single equation specification searches can be notoriously inefficient (neglecting important cross-equation information) and, thereby, produce a variety of 'acceptable' alternative specifications, we chose to report only OLS estimates for the specification that was ultimately selected by the full system search implemented in section 5 (columns 2 and 4 in table 6; columns 1 and 3 supporting evidence for our final implementation of the legal family effects). Table 6 reports regression equations that complement the reduced form equations in table 5 in a way that will be clarified further in section 5. The first column reports regression results for legality on the transplant effect and the German and Scandinavian families. While the transplant effect is significantly negative, the separate German and Scandinavian variables are positive but insignificant (the p-values are .13 and . 19) . By inspection of the point estimates and the standard errors, the German and Scandinavian variables have a roughly similar impact on legality. The F test for the null hypothesis that the German effect equals the Scandinavian effect supports this observation: it has a p-value of .9211 and allows us to combine the German and Scandinavian families into one German&Scandinavian dummy variable.
The second column in Table 6 reports the best restricted reduced form for legality. Three points are noteworthy. First, the fit is striking: the adjusted R 2 of .6874 is higher than any of the reduced forms for legality in Table 5 . Second, this reduced form statistically encompasses the less restricted reduced form for legality in Table 5 .
The F-test for the null hypothesis that these two specifications encompass each other has a p-value of .7582, and cannot be rejected. Finally, this reduced form provides evidence that the transplant effect is more important than the supply of any particular legal family. The transplant effect has a coefficient of -6.603 and is significant at the 1-percent level; the German&Scandinavian coefficient has a coefficient of 1.759 and is significant at the 10-percent level. To compare the impact of these two effects, note that our legality measure ranges from 8.50 to 21.90
and has a standard deviation of 4.32. Thus, for a transplant effect country in the English or French family, the impact of reversing the transplant effect would be a one and a half standard deviation increase in legality. A reversal for a transplant effect country in the German family would be a still impressive 1.1 standard deviation increase in legality.
14 It is not possible to infer from our data, however, that picking a particular legal family would have a significant impact on legality. Evidence in Table 5 suggests that legal families may be a spurious explanatory variable. The relative impact of legal families is different for the five legal proxies, and this implies that they are not statistically robust. Evidence provided by La Porta et al (1998, Table 6) shows that the relative impact of the legal families on the legality proxies changes even after controlling for GNP per capita. Legal families, by themselves, have very little power to explain the legality proxies: their share of the variance in the five legality proxies is between 17.4% and 26.3% . Further evidence that legal families are not statistically robust explanatory variables for legality is presented in Section 5.
A criticism of our restricted reduced form is that it ignores the impact of economic development on legality. Figure 1 suggests that once we control for log GNP per capita, the transplant effect would have no explanatory power. In Table 7 we control for log GNP and check for the impact of the transplant effect and legal families on legality. 15 The transplant effect still is significant at the 1-percent level, and depresses legality by more than half a standard deviation.
Economic development, legal families and the transplant effect
An understanding of the relationship between the transplant effect, the supply of legal families and economic development is critical for the design of legal reform. If there is a direct relationship between the transplanting process and economic development, then there is reason to believe that a well designed legal reform would have an immediate impact of GNP per capita. If, however, the transplant effect has primarily an indirect impact through its impact on legality, then an effective legal reform can improve legality, which, over time, will raise economic development. We have shown in section three that legal families have a small, if not negligible, impact on legality.
This implies that supplying a particular legal family has no indirect impact on GNP per capita. However, if legal families had a direct impact on GNP per capita, then policy makers could perhaps expect to get a direct and immediate gain in GNP per capita by picking the best family.
The unrestricted reduced form for log GNP per capita in the last column of Table 5 provides a useful overview of the impact of transplant effect and legal families on economic development. The test statistics provide evidence that the receptive-direct transplant can be excluded; the legal families can be jointly excluded; the three transplant effect dummy variables cannot be excluded; and, these three transplant effect categories can be combined into a single transplant effect. The last column in Table 6 presents our best restricted reduced form for Log GNP per capita: it includes a transplant effect and a French&German dummy variable. Several test statistics provide intuition for its derivation. First, as shown in the third column in Table 3 , the F-test for the null that the German and French families have similar impact has a p-value of .2745 and cannot be rejected. The F-test for the null that the best reduced form for legality encompasses the less restricted reduced form in Table 5 is reported in the last column of Table 6 : it has a p-value of .6438, and cannot be rejected.
This reduced form for log GNP per capita in Table 6 Table 6 , the adjusted R 2 falls only marginally from .5756 to .5484.
Furthermore, if we regress any combination of families on log GNP per capita and exclude the transplant effect, the highest adjusted R 2 that we obtain is an unimpressive .21 16 .
The first regression in Table 7 shows that the transplant effect on log GNP per capita is completely indirect. The transplant effect coefficient in this regression is the direct effect, since it measures the transplant 16 More evidence is provided in Section 5. effect after accounting for its impact via legality. The direct transplant effect coefficient is statistically insignificant. Multiplying the legality coefficient in the second regression (.323) times the transplant effect coefficient in the best restricted reduced form for legality in table 6 (-6.603), the approximate indirect effect of transplant effect on log GNP per capita is -2.13 (roughly 1.42 standard deviations away from the mean log GNP per capita).
As already noted in the introduction, the policy implication of this result is fundamental. An effective legal reform strategy should include measures that would avoid the transplant effect. Furthermore, because the impact of the transplant effect on economic development is purely indirect, there is no reason to believe that a legal reform would have a direct and immediate impact on GNP per capita. Finally, because the transplant effect dominates the impact of legal families, and legal families may have a spurious impact on economic development, our econometric results provide no support for the idea that picking the correct family would lead to a direct and immediate gain in economic development
To check for robustness of the results in Tables 5, 6 and 7, we change Mexico from a unreceptive-indirect transplant to half a unreceptive-indirect and half a receptive-indirect transplant; we also change Portugal and
Spain from unreceptive-direct to half unreceptive-direct and half receptive-direct. While Mexico copied the Spanish commercial code in an unreceptive fashion in 1854, twenty years later Mexico promulgated a civil code using various sources and including lessons from legal practice, and subsequently also revised the commercial code. While we usually use the date of the first reception, these two dates are very close. Moreover, it is questionable whether the earlier code had a long-term impact, because it was quickly superseded. Spain and Portugal are included in robustness test, because their proximity to France and Germany could suggest that they were fairly familiar with the modern formal legal order that developed in these countries, even though they themselves did not directly participate in this development. All of our results are robust to these modifications.
Further statistical investigations
In sections 3 and 4, we defined legality as being the principal component of five out of six of our initial measures of legal performance. It is critical to emphasize here the fact that a principal component is defined as the linear combination of the initial variables, which has maximal variance, unconditionally on any regressors. This is obviously not what we are interested in per se. Our primary interest lies instead in analyzing the relationships between economic development, legality, the transplant effect and legal families. While the use of a principal component for legality appears to have produced a truly interesting and easily interpretable story, we have no guarantee at this stage of our analysis that it has not overly simplified or even grossly distorted the underlying story.
The object of the present section is that of estimating and extensively testing a joint econometric six equations model for our five measures of legal performance together with GNP per capita, conditional on all other variables introduced earlier. For the ease of notation we present our model with reference to a single arbitrary country. Let y denote the vector comprising the five measures of legal performance retained for analysis and g the log of GNP per capita. Let x regroup all relevant exogenous variables consisting of four transplant variables and three legal families as in section 4. Each equation also includes a constant term capturing the reference scenario (origin-English). We immediately eliminate these constant terms from the model by expressing all variables in deviations from their sample means. This elimination implies that the intercepts are not subjected to any of the restrictions, which are implemented below, in reflection of the fact that the five measures of legal performance are not mean-standardized.
Our baseline (maintained hypothesis) model consists of six fully unrestricted reduced form equations for y and g, conditionally on x. Actually such a model can be equivalently represented in the form of five reduced form equations for y given x and of one unrestricted regression equation for g, given y and x. This latter representation will prove to be particularly operational for the purpose of our analysis. Therefore, let Note that u and v are independent from one another by construction. For the ease of comparison with results derived by La it is useful to present also the reverse factorization of our baseline model, denoted as follows
These two factorizations are observationally equivalent, merely corresponding to alternative one-to-one reparametrizations of the unrestricted reduced from of the model. Their respective parameters are linked by the following identities.
The parametric restrictions we will discuss in a moment are naturally related to factorization (9). The implied restrictions on factorization (10) would be exceedingly tedious to derive analytically, but are trivial numerically implement by means of the identities (11) and (12).
The very first step toward validating the use of a principal component consists of testing whether or not the five components of y are actually proxies of a common univariate concept. The statistical translation of this question corresponds to the following hypothesis.
Π is of rank 1, that is to say that there exists
Note that β and γ are only defined up to a proportionality factor. To remove this ambiguity and identify β and γ , we impose the condition that .
Under H a we can reinterpret the equation system in (9.1) in the following observationally equivalent form: there exists a univariate latent variable ξ (which is obviously to be interpreted as legality) which is such that:
which, by elimination of ξ produces the system (9.1) subject to H a . The corresponding reinterpretation of Ω is given by
While β is identified by assumption H a , Σ and 2 σ are not identified in full, but Ω is. An assumption which naturally complements H a is that whereby only ξ enters the GNP regression equation (9.2), not all five y's individually
If H a and H b hold together we reach the conclusion that there indeed exists a univariate legality concept ξ which fully captures the interactions we wish to analyze. However, there is still nothing at this stage of the discussion that tells us that the linear combination y β′ does coincide with the principal component of the y. The missing link is provided by a third assumption that we formulate as follows:
This assumption whereby Σ is singular, fully identifies Σ and σ 2 in equation (14), since it now defines σ 2 as the eigenroot of Ω corresponding to the eigenvector β. More importantly, it also implies that the linear combination η β ′ in equation (13.2) 
where Φ denotes the covariance matrix of the x's. Add H c and we also have that to produce the key result that β is the principal component of the y's under H a and H c . In view of the significant variability of the x's which is represented by the covariance matrix Φ, of the order of magnitude of the γ's and of the relatively good fit of equations (13.1) and (13.2), these inequalities are fully supported by the data which, in particular, immediately explains why we will find that the ML estimation of β under assumption H a and H c virtually coincides with the principal component of the y's.
As detailed in Appendix, we can estimate the model (9) by ML under any combination of assumptions H a , H b and H c at the cost of introducing additional auxiliary reparameterizations that greatly reduce the computational burden (to a numerical optimization in β in the worst case scenarios).
We note that while H a and/or H c can be tested on their own, H b cannot since it remains tautological as long as β is not defined elsewhere in the model. Therefore, we shall test H b either in combination with H a or on its own with β being defined as the principal component of the y's.
In Table 8 we report p-values for a full model specification search covering twenty different submodels. In each box we report finite sample p-values for (up to) three LR test statistics under different null hypotheses: the final model (G), the one to the right (H) and the one below (V). These p-values are obtained by MC simulation:
under the appropriate null hypothesis and keeping the x's fixed, we generate 1,000 fictitious samples of size 49 for (y, g), evaluate the relevant LR test statistics and compute the fraction of simulated test statistics which are larger than the one obtained for the actual sample. This presentation enables one to visualize a full sequential search from the least restricted model (upper/left) down to the final model (lower/right) along different paths. In any event, the p-value of our final model against the least restricted one is an amazing 0.491. This is especially remarkable in view of the fact that, not counting intercepts, the unrestricted model has 6 x 7 =42 coefficients in Π and ½(6 x 7) =21 coefficients in Σ for a total of 63 coefficients. In contrast, our final model only has (4 + 1) + 1 +1 = 7 coefficients in (Π, b, c), 10 coefficients in Σ and 1 variance v 2 for a grand total of 18 coefficients! In the words of Hendry and Richard (1989) , our final model parsimoniously encompasses the unrestricted one, in spite of excellent fit of the latter (no R 2 is less than 0.65 in the reduced form and a remarkable 0.92 in the log GNP per capita regression!). Table 8 requires two additional comments. Firstly, the excellent fit of the models in row A do explain why some of the lowest p -values are found in row A/Vertical. In particular, the fully unconstrained OLS estimates of b in row A are generally fairly different from the estimates of β in rows B to D, but also much less accurate (there is just too much multicollinearity between the five measures of legality to get reliable estimates of their impact on GDP outside of a full system estimation). Secondly, and most importantly, the transplant effect shows up totally unambiguously from column (1), which is why it is immediately imposed from column (2) onward. In contrast, the role of legal families remains fairly ambiguous across columns (2) and (5). There always remain very few borderline significant coefficients here and there, not always the same from one specification to another. They do not tell a consistent story. They are not robust and might actually be picking up an occasional outlier. The only clear message is that the impact of legal families is always significantly smaller than that of transplant.
In view of the small sample size and of the fact that the restrictions imposed upon the model are highly non-linear, all standard deviations for our system estimates we also obtained from the MC simulations used for pvalues. Table 9 , which represents the system counterpart of Tables 6 and 7 , reports the estimates of the coefficients of interest of our final model together with (MC) standard deviations (including for R 2 's). The system results are quite similar to the OLS results in Tables 6 and 7 . They are somewhat more accurate, in spite of the fact that the β's are no longer treated as given, because the system estimates take full advantage of all the cross-equation restrictions that are built into our final model. This similarity in results suggests that further investigations, e.g.
under an extended data set sometime in the future, could usefully rely upon single equation least squares methods, using principal components for legality, though, most importantly, the full validation of such results does require system analysis (notwithstanding the fact that a system search such as the one summarized by Table 8 is far more informative than single equation searches. The final model estimated in Tables 6 and 7 and reestimated in Table 9 if the outcome of a full system search).
Finally, MC simulation enables us to cope with an additional problem which has not been mentioned anywhere until now, and results from the fact that the five legal variables are truncated at 1 (about 11% of the sample!). Though the legality aggregate y β′ is not as severely truncated-another good reason for using it-this finding begs the question of whether or not truncation might have (severely) biased our analysis. Several MC simulation runs under truncated distributions for the y's unambiguously indicate that this is not the case (fortunately because it really isn't feasible to estimate a five-dimensional truncated distribution from 49 data points!). Coefficient estimates are mildly biased especially in the legality reduced form equations, as to be expected, with no bias exceeding 10%. Similarly, some standard deviations are slightly upward biased. Most importantly, truncation has very little impact on the p-values reported in Table 9 and leaves all our key results fundamentally unaffected. (Variations of less than 10% in coefficient values are completely irrelevant in the context of our analysis.)
All together, we find that the full system analysis described in this section has brought unambiguously strong support to the conclusions reached earlier.
Conclusions
We have shown that the way in which the law was initially transplanted is a more important determinant of legality than the supply of a particular legal family. Furthermore, the legal transplantation process has a large, albeit indirect, effect on economic development via its impact on legality. The policy implications of these findings have been discussed throughout the text, and will not be repeated here. What is important to note is that there are several open questions remaining. First, we have conducted our analysis using a sample of 49 countries. It is now critical to broaden the data set and check for the robustness of the transplant effect as well as the impact of legal families. As noted in section 5, we could employ our statistical techniques even if the data for the five legal proxies is incomplete. Secondly, as noted in the introduction, our model under-predicts the legality performance of transplant effect countries including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Spain, and Portugal. Understanding just how these countries managed to reverse the transplant effect might provide lessons for the design of legal reform and is an area for future research. 
Log Legality
Box 1
Definitions of Terms and Concepts
Legal Family Formal legal systems the major features of which can be traced to a common source. The four major legal families in the world that are commonly distinguished are the English common law, the French, the German, and the Scandinavian legal families. Origin
Country that developed its formal legal system internally. Transplant
Country that received major features of its legal system from another country.
Direct transplant
Country that received its formal legal system from an origin country.
Indirect transplant
Country that received its formal legal system from another transplant.
Voluntary transplant
Country that made an active decision to copy the formal legal system of another country.
Involuntary transplant
Country on which the formal legal system of another country was imposed. Transplant with adaptation A transplant that introduces changes into the law to take account of local conditions, including preexisting law. Transplant with familiarity A transplant with a significant share of the population that is familiar with the transplanted legal concepts as a result of a shared history or sizeable immigrant population. Receptive transplant A transplant with adaptation and/or familiarity. Unreceptive transplant A transplant without adaptation and/or familiarity. Shareholder rights are on the left-hand side; creditor rights are on the right-hand side. b A two-sided two-sample t test with unequal variances is performed. *Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 10 percent level. Shareholder rights are on the left-hand side; creditor rights are on the right-hand side. b A two-sided two-sample t test with unequal variances is performed. *Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 10 percent level. La Porta et al. (1998) code Israel as belonging to the English common law family. NOTE: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The origin dummy and English dummy variables are normalized at zero. *Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 10 percent level. Table Table 5 Table 5 .52 .68 Probability > F .7582 .6438 Note: Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. A Transplant effect includes receptive-direct transplants and both unreceptive transplants. *Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 10 percent level 
